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Statutory Interpretation, Morality, 
and the Text 
Lawrence M. Solan† 
In this essay, I wish to explore the question of whether 
certain approaches to statutory interpretation can be regarded 
as wrongful. My argument concerns instances in which 
interpreters take advantage of linguistic accident to license 
arguments that flout the intent or purpose of a law. 
Philosopher Bernard Williams calls reliance on literal meaning 
in this manner “fetishizing assertion,”1 and considers it 
tantamount to lying.  
If linguistic practices that rely too heavily on linguistic 
accident are wrongful, then serious ethical questions present 
themselves to the legal system. For if we acknowledge the 
problem, we then are forced to ask ourselves how comfortable 
we are with a rule of law that cannot rely fully on the law as 
written to sustain its legitimacy. In this brief essay, I raise 
these issues, and comment on their relationship to questions of 
judicial candor in cases concerning the interpretation of 
statutes. I conclude that especially when there is doubt about 
meaning, or suspicion that the legislature has erred, it is 
essential to turn to the purpose of the law in order to avoid the 
moral consequences of assertive fetishism. I further argue that 
recourse to purpose, contrary to the views of many, actually 
reduces the range of judicial discretion, and that those who 
associate purposive interpretation with judicial activism 
appear to be subject to a cognitive bias—the conjunction 
fallacy. 
  
 † Don Forchelli Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. My thanks to Ralf 
Poscher and to participants in the Brooklyn Law School symposium on statutory 
interpretation for helpful comments. This research was sponsored by a summer 
research stipend from Brooklyn Law School. 
 1 BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS 100-10 (2002). 
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I. MORALITY, SPEECH, AND INTERPRETATION 
Lying is an immoral act—at least most of the time. It is 
prohibited in many legally relevant contexts. Lying under oath 
is perjury.2 Lying in business affairs is fraud.3 Lying to 
government officials is a crime in itself.4 Lying in the course of 
acting as a lawyer is sanctionable misconduct.5  
In some, but not all, of these contexts, misleading 
another person into believing to be true something the speaker 
believes to be false is also both immoral and legally prohibited. A 
truthful, but misleading, statement can be just as much a fraud 
as a false statement.6 In fact, fraud is defined to include both 
species of deception. In some instances, it might even seem 
worse for a person to scheme to misdirect his target through a 
series of truthful statements than it does to tell an outright lie. 
While the liar has to take responsibility for his falsehood, the 
deceiver can feel virtuous at not having said anything false 
while arriving at the same result: successfully leading someone 
to believe something to be true that the speaker knows is false.7 
For this reason, many moral philosophers draw no distinction 
between the two.8 Bernard Williams goes even further, 
denouncing reliance on the truth for moral justification of a 
fraudulent act as immoral in its own right.9 
How does deception work? Like persuasion, deception 
depends on a change in the state of mind of the hearer (or 
reader).10 To succeed, the deceiver calculates the inferences that 
a person is likely to draw from a speech act and leads the 
target to draw just the inferences that will accomplish the task 
  
 2 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006). 
 3 For definitions, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525-26 (1977). 
 4 See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006). 
 5 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 8.4 (2010). 
 6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 529 (“Representation Misleading 
Because Incomplete: A representation stating the truth so far as it goes but which the 
maker knows or believes to be materially misleading because of his failure to state 
additional or qualifying matter is a fraudulent misrepresentation.”). 
 7 See Jonathan E. Adler, Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating, 94 J. PHIL. 
435, 439-40 (1997). 
 8 See, e.g., T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 320 (1998); 
JENNIFER SAUL, LYING, MISLEADING AND WHAT IS SAID (forthcoming) (manuscript at 
10-13) (on file with author).  
 9 WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 100-10. 
 10 Philosopher J.L. Austin refers to this as the “perlocutionary effect” of the 
statement. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 108 (J.O. Urmson ed., 1965). 
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of deception.11 The better the calculation, the more likely the 
deception. And these calculations are easy enough, at least 
much of the time. It is not at all difficult to deceive, because we 
are all aware that people tend to draw the inferences we intend 
them to draw in everyday conversation. In fact, we say the 
things we do with those inferences in mind. If I ask you, as 
your guest, “where’s the telephone,” we both understand that I 
am asking you if I can use the phone, and the assumption is 
that I will not use it in a way that will cost you money (or at 
least no more money than our relationship would bear within 
the bounds of politeness). Neither of us has said any of this, but 
I know what you will infer before I speak. In essence, we both 
apply Grice’s cooperative principle, which says that we 
construe conversations to proceed as a cooperative interaction, 
drawing whatever inferences we need to draw for that to 
happen.12 You draw those inferences as the hearer, and I adjust 
what I say around the inferences that I (correctly, we hope) 
predict that you will draw. 
Now, let us assume that you and I are negotiating some 
kind of deal. I know that if you speak with Hannes before 
signing on the dotted line, you will find out that the deal is 
unfair to you, and I also know that you want to speak to Hannes 
because you value his counseling. It is the kind of conversation 
that you would only have with Hannes in person if he is 
available. I would rather that you and Hannes not speak. You 
ask: “Have you seen Hannes recently?” I answer truthfully: “I 
saw Hannes in Washington last week.” What I didn’t add was 
that Hannes is now staying at a hotel in New York two blocks 
from where we are having our conversation, and that I just had 
dinner with him there last night. With only a little luck, your 
trust in me will cause you to snap at the bait, and I will be home 
free. In our story, I have committed an immoral act, whether or 
not you believe that telling an actual lie would have been an 
even greater affront (I personally do not think so).  
Now let us ask whether, just as one can act immorally 
by misdirecting someone with statements that are literally 
truthful, one can act immorally by construing a statement of 
another in a manner consistent with the words, but 
  
 11 This perspective is consistent with the signal approach to communication, 
described in Cheryl Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from 
Positive Theories of Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957 (2007). 
 12 H. P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS 41, 45 (P. 
Cole & J. Morgan eds., 1975).  
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inconsistent with the inferences that the context dictates would 
be reasonable to draw. That is, can I commit a reciprocal moral 
wrong if I make it your problem that your words can be 
construed in a manner contrary to your intended 
communicative desires, and perhaps, contrary to your 
interests, even when I know what you are trying to say? I think 
the answer is yes. Going back to our conversation about 
Hannes’s whereabouts, let us assume that, after seeing Hannes 
in Washington last week, I have not seen him since. I have no 
idea where he is now. You, however, would gain some 
advantage from my acknowledging that I had seen him 
yesterday, although I hadn’t. You then tell others that I did not 
deny having seen Hannes yesterday when I said that I had 
seen him last week, and that I spoke indirectly when you asked 
about Hannes, casting suspicion on my honesty. You never lie, 
but you have insincerely taken my words to imply things I 
never intended them to imply, and that the normal rules of 
implicature would not support. This makes you an immoral 
listener, just as the first story made me an immoral speaker. 
Of course, your immoral act does not end with your 
having intentionally misconstrued my words. For you have not 
only misconstrued them, but you have presented your 
interpretation to others knowing that you did not fairly report 
the substance of my message, in order to deceive them without 
presenting them with a bald-faced lie. I will not here address 
the morality of the person who privately perverts the intended 
meaning of a communication without letting anyone know 
about it. When the distorted interpretation is reported, though, 
the interpretive act has been transposed into a deceptive 
speech act, which is precisely what we saw to be 
uncontroversially immoral above. That is why the two acts are 
reciprocal moral wrongs. 
Moreover, we would draw the same conclusions about 
your morality if you were to take advantage of an error I made 
in what I said. Assume that I met Hannes on Tuesday of last 
week. We both know this because you were also there. In a 
subsequent conversation with you, I accidentally refer to 
having seen Hannes on Wednesday. We both know that by 
Wednesday, Hannes had flown to London, and that I didn’t see 
him that day and could not have seen him that day even if I 
had wanted to see him that day. Nonetheless, knowing that I 
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had made a simple speech error,13 you find a way to take 
advantage of the fact that I said Wednesday instead of 
Tuesday, perhaps implying that I was scheming with Hannes, 
or that I am a liar, or something else that you know not to be 
true. Again, you never lie, but you construe my words both 
insincerely and ungenerously, and then report your construal 
to others. Lawyers do this all the time when they engage in 
aggressive cross-examination of an opposing witness. It is 
insincere in that context, whether or not it is justified or 
required by the lawyer’s obligation to advocate zealously. 
Should statutory interpreters behave similarly? Nothing in the 
nature of the adversarial system, which is what justifies the 
cross-examiner, suggests that they should be given similar 
license. 
II. USING STATUTORY LANGUAGE TO FLOUT PURPOSE 
I suggest that judges sometimes behave toward 
legislatures and toward litigants just as you behaved toward 
me in our hypothetical stories about Hannes, whether you took 
advantage of an inference that was available but not a fair 
interpretation of my words, or whether you took advantage of a 
mistake. They take advantage of linguistic indeterminacy to 
interpret language that undermines the communicative intent 
of the speaker, in this case, the legislature. Sometimes, the 
indeterminacy results from a presumed chain of inferences, as 
in our hypothetical. At other times, it results from vagueness or 
from ambiguity. In still other cases, judges take advantage of 
errors in drafting. 
Before I illustrate this point with examples from case 
law, I wish to make two points. First, these problems do not 
arise in every case. Typically, cases involve precisely the 
situation that the statute was enacted to address. Thus, as is 
  
 13 In everyday interactions, we routinely compensate for grammatical errors 
of others and construe the utterances as they were intended to be construed. For recent 
studies, see Lyn Frazier & Charles Clifton, Jr., Quantifiers Undone: Reversing 
Predictable Speech Errors in Comprehension, 87 LANGUAGE 158 (2011). Frazier and 
Clifton note that such compensation for grammatical errors may be more prevalent in 
informal speech than in the construal of formal writings, a fact obviously relevant to 
the legal context. See id. at 167-68. This distinction among registers suggests that 
individuals confronted with obvious errors in formal settings are more likely to be 
consciously aware of the mistake, and then must decide how to construe the language: 
as literally written, or as an error. The fact that we so routinely compensate for speech 
errors in a manner respectful of communicative intent suggests that self-consciously 
doing the opposite in formal settings flouts social norms and is construed as such. 
1038 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:3 
often true with controversial statutory cases, we are dealing 
with situations that occur at the margins. Moreover, even when 
judges have the opportunity to flout the legislature’s intent or 
purpose, they usually do not do so because they regard their 
roles, at least in part, as furthering the will of the legislature.14 
This essay, then, is truly about outliers. 
Second, the judicial practices that I criticize might be 
defended as the best practices even if I am right that they are 
laced with immoral linguistic games. That is because sticking 
closer to the text than to a set of expected inferences has its 
own systemic advantages, many of which are described in the 
literature defending textualism.15 One may argue that the risk 
of an occasional misreading of communicative intent is a small 
price to pay for the democratically salient principle of 
legislative primacy. This argument is convincing in some 
contexts, but not in the ones that form the subject of this essay. 
I return briefly to this question later. 
The cases that most clearly illustrate my point are ones 
in which the statute is susceptible to multiple interpretations, 
whether because of syntactic ambiguity, lexical ambiguity, or 
vagueness (i.e., the case involves a borderline case of a 
statutory word), and a court chooses to ignore the purpose of 
the legislation and to take advantage of the linguistic opening. 
Consider Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., decided by 
the Supreme Court in 2007.16 It is an unfair employment 
practice under the Civil Rights Act to discriminate against “any 
individual with respect to his compensation . . . because of such 
individual’s . . . sex.”17 Ledbetter claimed that she was being 
  
 14 See, for example, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2010), for a 
recent case in which the majority opinion, 131 S. Ct. at 1080-81 (Scalia, J.); the 
concurring opinion, 131 S. Ct. at 1085-86 (Breyer, J., concurring); and the dissenting 
opinion, 131 S. Ct. at 1086-87 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), all make specific reference to 
the intent of the legislature. I discuss the debates about the propriety of referring to 
legislative intent, and the fact that judges of all political and philosophical stripes refer 
to such information in LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND 
THEIR INTERPRETATION ch. 3-4 (2010).  
 15 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997) (arguing that since statutes are legislatively enacted and 
intentions are not, that the proper role of courts is to construe only the language of the 
statutes themselves); John Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 
(2003) (arguing that with an enhanced theory of word meaning, it becomes less 
necessary to look outside the statutory language itself, thus constraining judicial 
decision making). 
 16 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
 17 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a)(1) (2006). 
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paid less because of her sex.18 The statute has a 180-day statute 
of limitations. Although her claim was filed more than 180 days 
after the discrimination had allegedly begun, Ledbetter argued 
that her claim was timely as long as it applied only to those 
paychecks issued in the past 180 days.19 In other words, her 
claim was that each time that Goodyear paid her less than they 
would have paid her if she were male, she had been subject to 
discrimination. 
In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected this position, 
accepting instead Goodyear’s argument that the ordinary 
meaning of “discriminate” would focus on the decision to pay her 
less, made long ago, and not on the ministerial act of cutting a 
paycheck.20 Of course, the Court was right about that. And the 
Court does often employ the canon that statutory words should 
be construed in their ordinary sense.21 Justice Scalia has 
explained that the canon is used as a surrogate for investigating 
intent: “The question, at bottom, is one of statutory intent, and 
we accordingly begin with the language employed by Congress 
and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language 
accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”22 
Nonetheless, it defies common sense to think that 
Congress intended to create a safe harbor for salary 
discrimination not discovered within six months. As Justice 
Ginsburg noted in dissent, unlike promotion decisions, 
compensation decisions are “hidden from sight,” and 
comparative information becomes known only after time, if at 
all.23 The decision literally gives an employer leave, after six 
months, to say to an employee, “I just want you to know that I 
am paying you less because you are a woman, and I have been 
doing it for long enough that I can do it forever.” The statutory 
language licenses the majority decision—it is surely not 
without basis. But the majority has taken advantage of a 
linguistic opening to flout the purpose of the statute. I suggest 
here that this practice is morally wrong in everyday life, and I 
can see no reason for it to be less so when judges engage in it. 
  
 18 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 621-22. 
 19 Id. at 624-25.  
 20 Id. at 628-29. 
 21 For discussion of the ordinary meaning canon, including linguistic 
justification, see SOLAN, supra note 14, at 53-81. 
 22 Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (quoting 
FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57 (1990); Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, 
Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 23 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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In 2009, Congress amended the law to make this interpretation 
no longer available, requiring that the statute of limitations be 
reset with the issuance of each paycheck.24  
More difficult are cases in which it appears that the 
legislature erred. Unlike cases involving statutes whose literal 
meaning is ambiguous, these cases actually do pit the literal 
meaning of the statute against the goals that the legislature was 
attempting to accomplish. And not all errors are the same, as 
Jonathan Siegel pointed out in his important work on this 
issue.25 The easier of these cases involve scrivener’s errors in 
which the legislature seems to suffer a written slip of the tongue. 
United States v. Locke26 illustrates this problem. A statute 
requires that a person claiming mineral rights on federal land 
file a statement with the Bureau of Land Management “prior to 
December 31 of each year.”27 Although it is possible that 
Congress intended to require that claimants file by December 
30, the likelihood is that Congress meant to say “by” instead of 
“prior to.” Thinking that the statute required only that the claim 
be filed by year end, Locke filed his claim for his mineral mine in 
Nevada on the last day of the year.28 The Bureau of Land 
Management held him in default of the filing requirement and 
proceeded to take away the mineral rights.29 The situation was 
made worse by the fact that a member of Locke’s family had 
called the Bureau’s office and was told that the filing had to be 
made by the end of the year.30 However, the doctrine that the 
government may not be estopped as a result of its errors made 
this fact appear to be legally irrelevant.31 
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s majority opinion showed 
little sympathy for the Lockes. On its face, such an opinion, 
although perhaps justifiable in its respect for the language that 
  
 24 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. It is 
often the case that legislative overrides of judicial decisions occur in so-called “plain 
language” situations where a court argues that it has no choice but to rule in a manner 
that the legislature no doubt did not intend. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding 
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 347 (1991). For 
discussion of congressional overrides in the context of the civil rights laws, see Deborah 
A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of 
Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511 (2009).  
 25 Jonathan R. Siegel, What Statutory Drafting Errors Teach Us About 
Statutory Interpretation, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 309 (2001). 
 26 471 U.S. 84 (1985). 
 27 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (2006). 
 28 Locke, 471 U.S. at 89-90. 
 29 Id. at 90. 
 30 Id. at 89 n.7. 
 31 Id. 
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the legislature actually used, is morally questionable. The legal 
system is taking advantage in two different ways of a 
legitimate misunderstanding that the system itself caused: by 
enacting a statute that was “a trap for the unwary,” as Judge 
Posner has noted,32 and then by misinforming a member of the 
public about what the law said because the government 
workers themselves had fallen into the trap. I would hold 
Justice Marshall and those who voted with him morally 
blameworthy if it were not for a footnote in the opinion that 
threatened the government with abandonment of the “no 
estoppel” doctrine when the case was remanded.33 Lawyers for 
the government read the footnote and gave the mineral rights 
back to Locke.34 Thus, the case successfully applauds language-
based rule of law values without allowing one side or the other 
to take undue advantage of a communicative error. Most cases, 
however, do not accomplish these goals simultaneously.35 
Less nuanced is Judge Bybee’s dissenting opinion in 
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit 
Service, Inc.36 The Class Action Fairness Act liberalizes removal 
to federal court of class actions filed in state court, and calls for 
removal decisions to be appealed as follows:  
[A] court of appeals may accept an appeal from an order of a district 
court granting or denying a motion to remand a class action to the 
State court from which it was removed if application is made to the 
court of appeals not less than 7 days after entry of the order.37 
This is obviously a legislative error. Congress meant to say “not 
more than 7 days . . . .” What sense does it make to say that an 
unsuccessful party must wait a week, and then has until the 
end of time to appeal? Arguing that the language should be 
applied as written, Judge Bybee adduced textualist rhetoric. 
  
 32 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 267-68 (1990). 
 33 Locke, 471 U.S. at 89 n.7. 
 34 I describe this history in more detail in SOLAN, supra note 14, at 109. 
 35 For one that does not, see Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007), in which 
a judge had misinformed a prisoner of the time that he had to file an appeal, and the 
Supreme Court ruled that the law should be interpreted literally, since the statute was 
jurisdictional in nature, id. at 206-07, an interpretation that is legitimate, but not 
necessary given the statutory language. 
 36 448 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2006) (Bybee, J., dissenting). For further 
discussion of this case, see Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of 
Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117 (2009), and my response to Professor Siegel, Lawrence 
M. Solan, Response, Opportunistic Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 225, 228-
29 (2010), http:///www.pennumbra.com/response/104-2010/solan.pdf. 
 37 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
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Arguing that Congress did not make a scrivener’s error, which 
a court might have the right to correct, Bybee continued:  
Section 1453(c)(1) makes perfect sense; it is fully grammatical and 
can be understood by people of ordinary intelligence. That we think 
Congress might choose a different word if it decides to redraft the 
statute hardly means that someone made a “typographical error” 
that the court may blithely correct. “‘It is beyond [the Court’s] 
province to rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide 
for what we might think . . . is the preferred result.’”38  
Of course, the fact that the sentence is grammatical has 
nothing to do with whether the legislature committed an error 
in drafting. Bybee would have been on stronger moral grounds 
had he forthrightly admitted that the legislature made an 
error, but that in his view the legal system should trade some 
of its moral authority in an individual case for certainty, which 
brings credibility to the system. Instead, he engaged in 
fetishizing the assertion notwithstanding the legislature’s 
obvious communicative intent. 
Finally, let us look at a more difficult situation, one in 
which the legislature erred by writing a statute inconsistent 
with its purpose not because it used the wrong language, but 
because it based its legislative decision on erroneous facts. 
Consider United States v. Marshall,39 a case that is well known 
to law students. It pits Judges Easterbrook and Posner against 
each other in the Seventh Circuit. Perhaps for that reason, the 
circuit court opinions are studied more than is the Supreme 
Court’s affirmance.40 Marshall was convicted of distributing more 
than ten grams of “a mixture or substance containing more than 
a detectable amount of LSD.”41 The LSD, which weighs next to 
nothing, was sold on blotter paper, which is more than 100 times 
as heavy as the drug itself.42 Nonetheless, both the Seventh 
Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions. This, as 
Judge Posner wrote in dissent, resulted in the penalty per dose 
of LSD to exceed the per-dose penalty for other drugs to an 
extent that makes little sense.43 The best explanation is that 
Congress wrote a law in which LSD was treated like powder 
  
 38 Amalgamated, 448 F.3d at 1098 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 39 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 40 Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991). 
 41 Marshall, 908 F.2d at 1314-15. 
 42 Id. at 1315. 
 43 Id. at 1332-34 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
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drugs, such as heroin, because those who wrote the law did not 
know that the various drugs covered by the statute were neither 
manufactured nor sold in a comparable way.44 
Not all legislative errors are created equal. Judge 
Easterbrook’s majority opinion is not about taking advantage of 
linguistic accidence, but rather about taking advantage of 
legislative ignorance. There is no doubt that Congress 
intentionally punished LSD as it did. Favoring consideration of 
purpose in deciding which of two available readings should be 
accepted does nothing to compromise respect for the 
constitutionally mandated legislative process. Correcting 
linguistic errors in drafting intrudes further into the legislative 
process, but does no more than attempt to arrive at the 
legislature’s communicative intent. As noted above, we 
routinely compensate for grammatical errors in the speech of 
others, unselfconsciously drawing from the language the 
intended meaning.45 
The correction of legislative errors that concern 
mistakes of fact resulting in the enactment of senseless laws 
are more difficult, however. When the mistake is a scrivener’s 
error, the statutory interpreter who corrects the error says in 
essence, “You said x, but you meant to say y.” When, in 
contrast, the mistake is one of basing a law on an erroneous set 
of facts, the interpreter who corrects the error instead must say 
the equivalent of, “You intended to accomplish goal g by virtue 
of enacting law x. But x does not accomplish g. Rather, y does. 
So I will change x to y to assist you in achieving g.” Changing a 
law to better accomplish the legislature’s goal is more of an 
intrusion into the legislative process, and reasonable judges 
and scholars are likely to disagree about its propriety. Perhaps 
the appropriate solution of this case would have been to declare 
the law unconstitutional as applied, since the penalty, in the 
statutory scheme, lacks a rational basis. 
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND JUDICIAL CANDOR 
Judges must both decide disputes and explain the 
reasons for their decisions. Often, it is suggested, judges make 
decisions based on personal values, their own politics, or 
perhaps an unarticulated sense of the best decision under the 
  
 44 See id. at 1333-34. 
 45 See Frazier & Clifton, supra note 13. 
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law, which then must be justified post hoc. Gaps between 
reasonable inferences about what drove a judge to decide a case 
and the reasons for the decision that the judge articulates 
create the inference that judges are not being candid. David 
Shapiro describes the importance of judicial candor: 
A requirement that judges give reasons for their decisions—grounds 
of decision that can be debated, attacked, and defended—serves a 
vital function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise of power. In the 
absence of an obligation of candor, this constraint would be greatly 
diluted, since judges who regard themselves as free to distort or 
misstate the reasons for their actions can avoid the sanctions of 
criticism and condemnation that honest disclosure of their 
motivation may entail. In a sense, candor is the sine qua non of all 
other restraints on abuse of judicial power, for the limitations 
imposed by constitutions, statutes, and precedents count for little if 
judges feel free to believe one thing about them and to say another. 
Moreover, lack of candor seldom goes undetected for long, and its 
detection only serves to increase the level of cynicism about the 
nature of judging and of judges.46 
As Judge Posner points out in How Judges Think, the 
issue of candor arises more with the judges of high courts, the 
Supreme Court in particular, since those jurists have far more 
discretion than do lower court judges.47 Moreover, the cases 
most likely to generate published opinions are the more 
controversial ones, increasing the likelihood that a judge’s 
personal values will infiltrate the decision-making process. 
It is hard to believe it an accident that the five most 
conservative justices voted as they did in Ledbetter (the 
employment discrimination statute of limitations case), and 
that the four more liberal justices opposed them in dissent. It 
appears that the justices had reason to vote as they did based 
on their political and personal values, and used the linguistic 
opening as an opportunity to further these values. Not all cases 
involving assertive fetishism involve a lack of candor, just as 
not all cases that concern candor raise the moral issues 
discussed here. Nonetheless, the relationship between the two 
issues creates particularly troubling set of examples. Judges 
who simultaneously construe statutes in a way consistent with 
the language but inconsistent with the statute’s purpose, do so 
to further their own values, and hide the ball about all of this. 
  
 46 David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 
737 (1987) (footnotes omitted). 
 47 RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 269-323 (2008) (chapter entitled 
“The Supreme Court Is a Political Court”). 
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As for whether this lack of sincerity is appropriate, I 
agree with Professor Shapiro that it should be kept to a 
minimum. A recent article by Micah Schwartzman argues that 
judicial sincerity is important to a democracy, for people are 
entitled to know the reasons behind the ways in which the state 
treats them.48 While the lawyer may be insincere, the judge plays 
a different role. Yet, as Judge Posner points out, the 
requirement that judges write only about legitimate legal 
arguments severely restricts their decision-making options, and 
preserves rule of law values at least in part.49 The practice 
essentially tells judges: “Whatever your actual motivations for 
making a decision, unless you can justify it in legal terms to the 
legal community, you should not go there.” I surely do not 
recommend that judges cease this practice. However, when other 
values are self-evidently driving the decision-making process, 
this practice most likely comes at some cost in credibility. 
A model for judicial sincerity in this context is Chief 
Justice John Marshall’s decision in United States v. 
Wiltberger.50 A statute that federalized crimes committed on 
American vessels on the high seas, defined “high seas” to 
include rivers in other countries for most of the crimes, but 
failed to do so for the crime of manslaughter, with which 
Wiltberger was charged.51 Marshall, in his opinion, admitted 
that the legislature most likely intended to include this crime, 
but decided that the rule of lenity, which at the very least 
prohibits courts from expanding criminal liability beyond any 
reasonable reading of the statute, was the more important 
principle to apply.52 Thus, Marshall placed other values above 
the intent of the legislature. But he did not do so by either 
ignoring and flouting that intent as an opportunity to impose 
his own values, nor by pretending that he was unable to 
discern the legislature’s intent in such an obvious case. Rather, 
he placed his own hierarchy of values on the table, an act of 
judicial candor and commitment to avoiding the immorality of 
disrespecting communicative intent while pretending not to be 
doing so. Reasonable minds can disagree with Justice 
  
 48 Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 990-91 (2008). 
 49 See POSNER, supra note 47. A recent article by Mathilde Cohen takes a similar 
position, arguing that judges need to be candid about the legitimacy of the arguments they 
make, but not about their belief in them. Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason-Giving: 
When May Legal Decision-Makers Lie?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1091, 1098 (2010).  
 50 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820). 
 51 Id. at 98. 
 52 Id. at 99. 
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Marshall’s ruling, but he cannot be accused of falling prey to 
assertive fetishism. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I have argued in this essay that the legal system loses 
some moral high ground when judges take advantage of 
linguistic indeterminacy to flout the intent of the legislature to 
accomplish its goals. How important this is depends in part 
upon how much legitimacy is lost when the law operates in a 
manner that is inconsistent with the moral intuitions of 
citizens.53 I assume that there is at least some loss of legitimacy 
when judges make arguments that are both transparently 
insincere and wrongful in their treatment of language.  
I conclude by addressing some objections that may be 
made in response to my analysis. 
First, the legislature’s purpose is not always obvious. 
When statutes contain compromise, the purpose of a statute is 
to accomplish legislative goals to the extent that the 
compromises have allowed these goals to go forward. As Justice 
Scalia describes it, “the purpose of a statute includes not only 
what it sets out to change, but also what it resolves to leave 
alone.”54 To some extent, Scalia is correct. Nonetheless, when 
the question is which of two readings of a statute licensed by 
the language is the better one, we are not dealing with a 
question of unexpressed purpose or intent. In Ledbetter, for 
example, it is difficult to come up with any reason for Congress 
to have written a statute consistent with the majority position. 
My point is not that looking at text should be replaced by 
looking at purpose; in fact, I cannot think of anyone who takes 
that position as a general matter. Rather, my point is that 
when language is either uncertain or clearly mistaken, it is 
simply wrong to use the uncertainty to interpret a law in a 
manner that thwarts the communicative intent of the law. 
Second, one reason for reliance on text is that the 
legislature wrote the text, so sticking to the language creates 
fewer opportunities for judicial activism. Again, this is true 
when the decision is between paying attention to the language 
  
 53 See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME: 
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995), for discussion about the loss 
suffered by a legal system with large gaps between the intuitions of the community and 
the dictates of the code. 
 54 W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991). 
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on the one hand, or unexpressed purpose on the other. But 
paying attention to both ipso facto reduces judicial discretion. 
For the intersection of two considerations (in this case language 
and purpose) can be no greater than either of the considerations 
individually. To conclude otherwise reflects an error in 
reasoning that Kahneman and Tversky have called “the 
conjunction fallacy.”55 In their most famous example, a feminist 
named Linda who takes a job as a bank teller cannot be more 
likely to be a “feminist bank teller” than to be either a feminist 
or a bank teller.56 Yet people engage in this fallacy as a result of 
the mental models they form about the intersection of these 
traits. By the same token, if linguistic indeterminacy leaves two 
sensible interpretations, requiring that judges examine these 
interpretations with respect to furthering the legislature’s 
purpose cannot, as a logical matter, expand the number of 
possible readings that the judge has the discretion to impose. 
Third, there is one important difference between my 
stories about everyday deception on the one hand, and the 
undermining of legislative purpose on the other: the latter is 
transparent. When I deceive you about Hannes’s whereabouts, 
you cannot turn to a record, or to a dissenting opinion to learn 
the truth of the matter. On the contrary, if I am successful at 
deceiving you, you will never discover the truth. That is my 
very goal. Nonetheless, the presence of a public record, which 
includes opinions that run contrary to the offending one, does 
not excuse an individual judge from taking responsibility for a 
morally unjustified position. The fact that a bad act—even a 
bad interpretive act—is discoverable does not convert it into a 
good act. But the transparency does provide a partial 
vindication of the legal system as a whole, and is a positive 
attribute of the American legal order.  
Far more serious an objection to my position is the fact 
that the legal system might be doing the best it can whether or 
not I am right about the status of using language to flout 
purpose. If, for example, the kinds of cases that I describe 
rarely arise, but the value of focusing on linguistic nuance as a 
general matter enhances rule of law values, then perhaps it is 
best to tolerate small moral failures at the margins of a just 
and legitimate system. For example, a great deal of value is 
placed on requiring that statutory interpretation respect the 
  
 55 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: 
The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 293 (1983). 
 56 Id. at 299. 
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legislative process that led to the law’s enactment in the first 
place. I personally do not accept the argument that such 
linguistic fidelity excuses the legal system from acting in a way 
that we would regard as immoral in our everyday lives. The 
loss of legitimacy is not worth any perceived gains, and when it 
comes to construing statutes whose language is susceptible of 
only a single interpretation, there is no gain. However, if those 
who defend the status quo recognize the obligation to defend 
this balance of insincerity at the margins against the benefits 
of practices that reinforce formal and systemic values, then 
progress will have been made. 
